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The recent financial crisis showed that the institutions of the European Union (EU) and its mem-
ber states are poorly prepared for solving current problems of banks, which are experiencing
financial difficulties in European markets. In order to be able to further provide services for citi-
zens and companies, member states’ governments had to support bankswith public finances and
provide guarantees on an unprecedented scale. It did help to avoid a collapse of banks and a dis-
turbance of the economy, but only by putting the burden on taxpayers and thereby causing dete-
rioration in public finances. An agreement about the right course of action in the face of these
difficulties experienced by cross-national banks has not been reached either. The major situation
changer should be the European Banking Union (EBU), also called the Integrated Financial Sys-
tem, which is in the process of being created. The foundations for it have been laid during
Lithuanian presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2013. For Lithuania and all
other EU member states, joining the banking union will mean handing over important national
state powers to the European Union institutions.
Struktura i funkcjonowanie jednolitego mechanizmu restrukturyzacji
i uporz¹dkowanej likwidacji w europejskiej unii bankowej
Obecny kryzys finansowy pokaza³, ¿e instytucje unijne i pañstwa cz³onkowskie nie s¹ w pe³ni
przygotowane do rozwi¹zywania problemówbanków, które borykaj¹ siê z trudnoœciami finanso-
wymi na rynkach europejskich. Aby umo¿liwiæ œwiadczenie us³ug klientom indywidulanym
i korporacyjnym, rz¹dy poszczególnych pañstw cz³onkowskich udzieli³y bankom wsparcia ze
œrodków publicznych. Decyzja o udzieleniu pomocy finansowej pomog³a przetrwaæ instytucjom
bankowym i zapobieg³a dalszemu pogorszeniu siê sytuacji gospodarczej, ale obci¹¿y³a podatni-
ków,wskutek czego ucierpia³y finanse publiczne.Nie rozwi¹zano równie¿ trudnoœci zwi¹zanych
z dzia³alnoœci¹ banków transgranicznych. Sytuacja ma siê zmieniæ z zwi¹zku z planowanym
utworzeniem Europejskiej Unii Bankowej, czyli tzw. Zintegrowanego Systemu Finansowego –
projektu przedstawionego przez Litwê w trakcie jej prezydencji Rady Unii Europejskiej w dru-
giej po³owie 2013 r. Dla Litwy i innych pañstw cz³onkowskich przyst¹pienie do unii bankowej bê-
dzie oznacza³o przekazanie istotnych uprawnieñ w rêce instytucji unijnych.
Keywords: European Banking Union, Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution Mecha-
nism, Single Bank Resolution Fund, Single Resolution Board
JEL classification: E5, E6, H6, K4, R5
êIntroduction
The euro crisis caused by issues in global financial markets impelled the EU in-
stitutions and member states to implement reforms of their finance sector. A clear
vision of the future of economic and monetary union is needed, and all the neces-
sary reforms and decisions regarding EU institutions and its member states
should be guided by this vision. The European Commission (EC) seeks closer co-
operation, viewing it as one of the means for overcoming the crisis. The European
Banking Union (EBU) has not been established as a legal instrument so far. This is
a political vision of deeper EU integration, which will be based on recent conse-
quential actions and aim to tighten the regulations and control of the banking sec-
tor. This area also still needs development. Although the recent compromise on
EBU is expedient to Lithuanian interests, the above-mentioned problems remain
unsolved. Therefore, before making the final decision on Lithuania’s membership
in the eurozone and in the Banking Union, it is important to find answers to major
problematic questions.
The issues regarding the creation of the European Banking Union have not
been widely analysed in Lithuanian or international scientific literature so far. In
2013 the Bank of Lithuania carried out a study on the adoption of the euro planned
for 2015. The study analyses and makes the quantitative impact assessment of the
euro introduction on the national economy [Euro ivedimo…, 2013]. The results of
this quantitative study show that the euro introduction will have positive long-
-term effects which will significantly outweight short-term negative consequences,
such as the expenditure and size of Lithuania’s additional financial contributions.
However, this study is not directly concerned with the Banking Union. This sub-
ject is rarely analysed in Lithuanian academic research papers. Some aspects of
the recently created EBU were analysed by Vytatuas Šenavièius [Šenavièius, 2012,
pp. 405–416]. Considering that the Banking Union has only recently gotten under
its way, it is understandable that scientific literature on this subject is sparse. Foreign
academic papers provide a lot more in-depth analyses of these issues, in particular
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reform and the Single Resolution
Mechanism (SRM) [Whyte, 2012].
The aim of this paper is to point out the key issues of eurozone and to identify
the main elements of the Single Resolution Mechanism for the European Banking
Union. However, the question of the other pillar of the Integrated Financial Sys-
tem – namely the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) – is not among the issues
analysed by the authors in detail. This paper discusses the subject of the SSM in
only few words, as it is so complex that it could be the object of another research.
The methods implemented to conduct the research include the analytical
method and analysis of the research literature, documents, and statistical data.
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1. The main provisions of the Single Bank Resolution Mechanism
The key issue of European banks’ financial sector is closely connected to the
state support for national banking sector. Charles B. Blankart notices that the latter
accounted for a large portion of the country’s GDP [Blankart, 2011, p. 4]. State in-
tervention aimed at rescuing the banking sector began in the years 2008–2009
along with the global financial crisis. According to the latest Eurostat data, it has
reached undoubtedly dramatic proportions [Baciulis, 2013, pp. 1–4]. First and
foremost, these actions took by the EU member states had a negative impact on
their public finances. EU-27 governments are often criticized for financing the
banks restructurization with taxpayers’ money, which fundamentally opposes
the state public policy. It has also triggered a moral hazard – depositors and other
parties (investors), seeing their states spendingmoney on bank restructurizations,
took excessive risks, hoping that they would not go bankrupt thanks to the active
state aid instruments [Krimminger, 2006, pp. 1–2]. This clearly demostrates the
complexity of the situation. Likewise, the supervision over the banks and their in-
tegration must be conducted on the European Union level. It is impossible to im-
plement such an effective supervision and ruling mechanism only by using
national instruments.
The Banking Union will be based on a full and comprehensive single set of
rules for financial services. The European Banking Union is aimed at developing
integrated financial system, which will ensure the financial stability and reduce
the cost of a possible bank collapse, as it has been repeatedly emphasized by Her-
man Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council [Van Rompuy, 2012,
pp. 4–8]. These objectives were aproved by the European Council in 2012, on June
28–29 and December 13–14. The European Council placed the legislators (Euro-
pean Commission and European Parliament) under an obligation to develop ap-
propriate legal acts [EC, 2012]. Firstly, the Single Supervisory Mechanism for
European banks must be established, followed by the creation of the Single Reso-
lution Mechanism. The EU member states have already reached an agreement
about the SSM [CR, 2013]. The SSM operation will be based on current national
bank supervisory procedures and institutions. The European Parliament and the
Council have reached a provisional agreement on the procedures of the Single
Resolution Mechanism for the Banking Union proposed by the Commission. It
complements the Single Supervisory Mechanism which, once fully operational in
late 2014, will be applied for the major and systemically most important euro area
banks. The European Central Bank (ECB) will then directly supervise 130 of the
biggest (among 6000 operating) eurozone banks. Other banks, which do not meet
the set criteria, will remain under national supervision; nonetheless, the ECB will
have the authority to step in if it sees it necessary. For this reason it is essential
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emphasize one very simple and practical matter: the member states hand over
their power to the ECB, but they do not create any new institution. The ECB has
enough quality experts, which are well-acquainted with the current EU economic
and financial situation. The accumulation of functions in a single institution will
ensure the unity of the monetary policy of the EU and make it easier to reach an
agreement on a joint action.
However, the focus of this paper is another important pillar of the Banking
Union – the Single Resolution Mechanism. They will functionally complement
each other, as already mentioned above. It will be a second step on the road to the
creation of the EBU. This system will facilitate the cooperation between national
institutions in cases of a cross-border banking groups collapse. Themain principle
of the SRM is very simple: “Bail in”, and it is essentially intended to ensure that in
case of its bankruptcy, the bank would not pose a bigger threat to the state in
which it oprerates nor to the whole economy of eurozone. In case of bank crisis,
the SRM will enforce an effective reorganization at the lowest cost possible – for
taxpayers and for the real economy. Although the Single Resolution Mechanism
will apply only to the banks in the activity zone of the SSM, the rest of the smaller
banks will have to obey its rules if their international activity crosses the border
(“neighbourhood effect”). National resolution authorities would be responsible
for executing bank resolution plans under the supervision of the Single Resolu-
tion Board. Should a national authority neglect to comply with its decision, the
board could direct the executive orders straight to the collapsing bank. The Euro-
pean Banking Union is open to incorporate countries which do not belong to the
eurozone, too. In case of a positive scenario, these provisions should ensure a sus-
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Figure 1. The application of the Single Resolution Mechanism in the European Banking
Union
Source: Own elaboration.
tainable transition from “Bail out” to “Bail in” (banks covering their losses by
themselves) and the bank supervisionwould be supplemented by a strong and in-
tegrated system, devoted to saving the collapsing banks.
The SRM was divided into two separate documents in 2013: the European
Commission proposal on European Parliament and Council regulation and the
EU intergovernmental agreement. The EU regulationwill have to set a single reso-
lution mechanism for banks in the EU [EC, 2013]. The EU intergovernmental
agreement identifies the priciples of collecting financial contributions from na-
tional financial institutions of the member states participating in the European
Banking Union. It also determines that these contributions are to be transferred to
the Single Bank Resolution Fund. The SRM will be formed by two main constitu-
ents essential for its operation: the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and its use of
funds rules, and the Single Resolution Board, which participates in making deci-
sions regarding the collapsing bank. Themain objective of the EuropeanCommis-
sion’s proposed regulation is to enforce the implementation of the directive
dedicated to the banking sector rearrangement. This regulation should be en-
forced according to the centralized rules of the EU,with participation of the EU in-
stitutions and by applying the specific EU level procedures to the rearrangement
of troubled financial institutions. The issue of their centralized funding is also an
important subject matter of this regulation. The Single Resolution Mechanism
should be implemented through the Single Supervisory Mechanism. When the
EU member states join the SSM – they must also apply the SRM. The negotiations
about the SRM took place during the Lithuanian presidency of the Council of the
EU at the end of 2013. The ministers of the EU member states agreed on the shape
of the main Banking Union directives and SRM provisions.
2. The role of the Single Resolution Fund in providing
single financing for the bank resolution
As already mentioned, the Single Resolution Fund is a key element of the
SRM, without which it could not function properly. Different national funding
systems would distort the single bank resolution rules in the internal market. The
Fund should help to ensure a single administrative resolution of financing prac-
tice. The SRF should not allow any obstacles for exercising fundamental freedoms
or distortions of the competition within the internal market due to a different na-
tional practice. The SRF should be directly funded by the banks and its finances
should be concentrated at the Union level, in order to evenly distribute the re-
sources among all the member states, thus making it possible to improve the fi-
nancial stability and limit the connection between the envisaged fiscal condition
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among the individual member states and the expenditures for their banks and en-
terprises. The same funds, also financed by ex ante contributions of national
banks, will be established in all the eurozone member states (national Bank Reso-
lution Funds).
That notwithstanding, the principles of the SRF composition are not fully
clear. During the Lithuanian presidency of the Council of the EU it was agreed
that in the initial build-up phase of the fund, bridge financingwill be provided by
national sources backed by bank levies or by the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). The SRF is to be formed out of national compartments, yet it remains un-
clear whether the financial contributions to the fund would be made only by sys-
temic banks, or would other smaller banks and credit unions have to pay, too.
Lending money among the national compartments would also be a valid option.
During this transitional stage, a common backstop will be developed, which
would become fully operational in 8 years at the latest. The backstop would facili-
tate borrowings by the Fund. Finances accumulated in national funds would be
directed to the SRF. At the initial stage, these finances could only be used for rescu-
ing national banks of the state which paid the contribution to the SRF. For exam-
ple, in the transitional period, it would not be possible to finance Estonian or
Latvian bank resolution with finances from the Lithuanian resolution fund. Ac-
cordingly, the German resolution fund assets would be allocated only to saving its
national troubled banks. Each countrywill have to save its national banks using its
own finances. However, each year a national responsibility will decline and the
EU responsibility will increase. When the 8-year transitional period is over, na-
tional compartments will be combined and pooled into the Single EU Resolution
Fund. A gradually increasing part of each member state’s financial contribution
will thus end up in the SRF, whichwill become responsible for the resolution of all
the eurozone banks.
The BankRecovery and the ResolutionDirective also require banks to contrib-
ute an equivalent of 1% of covered deposits for defraying the costs of saving or
shuttering lenders. Collected money will be used for saving all the EU main sys-
temic banks. EUR 55 bn should be collected to the Single Resolution Fund by 2026,
however there is a serious possibility that this sum might be not enough. For ex-
ample, even after the collapse of the medium size Anglo Irish Bank in Ireland,
solving the succeeding crisis required EUR 30 bn [Irische Pleitbanker…, 2013].
Therefore, another way of financing the bank resolution was necessary, namely
the above-mentioned European Stability Mechanism. The ESM is a EUR 700 bn
worth fund created by 18 eurozone member states. Each eurozone member con-
tributes a certain part of its capital, according to the size of its national GDP. The
ESM provides about EUR 60 bn of additional funding to be used if necessary for
saving the EU main systematic banks [Hartmann-Wendels, 2013, p. 429]. How-
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ever, there is no agreement among the EUmember states on theways of using the
ESM assets. The ESM was created for the purpose of being able to provide loans
for the eurozone countries facing financial problems.
Under crisis conditions, the member states were rescuing their banks, which
were facing solvency issues, making decisions in order to reduce risks for their fi-
nancial systems. However, their actions not only had an impact on the national
public finances, but also, as already mentioned above, caused a moral hazard. It is
worth noticing that amoral hazard could be caused bymember states’ activity and
actions in the Banking Union, too. National governments will seek that their
banks, which stimulate the economy, serve only the national interests, deman-
ding that they provide generous credits for their national enterprises. And when
the risk of bank insolvency increases – they will try to cover the losses with SRF
and ESM assets from all the Banking Union countries. With regard to this, a ques-
tion ariseswhether the ESM funds should be used to stabilize the eurozone banks,
as it could cause a new moral hazard. Irresponsible states could even cause a crisis
and try to solve it with the help of the financial SRF and ESM contributions of
other member states.
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Figure 2. The Single Resolution Fund
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3. The Single Resolution Board
In addition to the establishment of the Single Bank Resolution Fund, another
important and much debated issue is: which institution would administer the
bank resolution process at the European Union level and could make the final de-
cision in particular situations? Before answering this question it is important to
make a distinction between executive and supervisory institutions. In order to re-
duce the risk to the national financial system in the USA in 2010, a so-called Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, better known as the Dodd–Frank
Act, was adopted. This legal act brought about the most significant changes in the
US financial regulation system since the Great Depression. It tightened the super-
vision of systemically important financial institutions. The US Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC) deals with banks at risk and is responsible for the
resolution of the troubled banks. The FDIC’s organizational structure could be
suitable for Europe, too. This federal agency was created in 1933, during the presi-
dency of F.D. Roosevelt (the Glass–Steagall Act), and aimed at insuring the bank
deposits. The FDIC operates effectively. During the 5-year period since 2008 fi-
nancial crisis, it has successfully restructured about 500 American banks [Grosse,
2013, p. 12–13]. Europe is seeking to create a similar type of institution within the
European Union. In the European Commission’s proposal on the European Par-
liament and Council regulation an important role is given to a newly established
agency, the Single Resolution Board (SRB), which becomes the main constituent
of the SRM. Corresponding agencies responsible for bank resolution will have to
be created on the national level in all the member states of the European Banking
Union. Such EU agencies are bodies distinct from the EU institutions – they are
separate legal entities set up to perform specific tasks under the EU law. There are
over 40 agencies of this type divided into 4 groups: decentralised agencies, execu-
tive agencies, EURATOM agencies, and the European Institute of Innovation and
Technology (EIT) [Agencies…, 2014]. Dealing with issues of the establishment of
a new agency, the Single Resolution Board, it should be noted that such agencies
contribute to regulation and administration of any assigned to them sector at the
European level. They also play a role in the implementation of specific EU policy,
covering different areas. Some of these agencies can make binding decisions. As it
can be observed, it is necessary to cope with a difficult task of keeping balance
between the functional benefit and the autonomy of agencies. Such agencies in
the European Union may be created on the basis of provisions for creation and
functioning of domestic market [JC, 2006].
After the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) on December 1, 2009, the proposed regulations and the European
SRB regulation gained a new legal base in Article 114 TFEU. The transfer of
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decision-making authority from the competent national governing institutions to
the Single Resolution Board assured by said Article cannot be associated with
awider range of activity than the coordination of the internalmarket [JC, 2014].
This newly created agency should guide the bank resolution process at the EU
level. The SRB and the European Commision, together with institutions of partici-
pating member states, will implement the SRM rules and procedures.
The EC should participate in the implementation of the Single Resolution
Mechanism only to the extent necessary for executing specific regulation tasks
and supervising the process following the state aid rules. The SRM board would
consist of the ECB, the European Commision, executive director, four appointed
members, and representatives of the national resolution authorities of all the par-
ticipating countries. It would exercise its tasks in either a plenary or executive for-
mat. The executive format is composed only of the executive director and the
appointed members, with the representatives of member states concerned with
a particular bank or bank group resolution decision, while the plenary format
would be responsible for decisions that involve: liquidity support exceeding 20%
of capital paid into the fund, bank recapitalisations exceeding 10% of funds, and
access to the fund once a total of EUR 5 bn has been used in a given calendar year.
The plenary session, voting by simple majority, would also have the right to op-
pose decisionsmade by the executive session that authorise the SRMboard to bor-
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Figure 3. The Single Resolution Board
Source: Own elaboration.
row funds. To guarantee the sovereignty of the members, the regulation prohibits
decisions that would require a member to provide extraordinary public support
without its prior approval under national budgetary procedures.
The SRMboard should have the authority to analyse and identify theways for
bank resolution. The board should also observe how bank resolution institutions
implement their decisions on the national level. It could provide executive decrees
for troubled banks in case national bank resolution authorities would not enact
the SRM board decisions. The national bank resolution authorities would be ac-
tively involved in this process.
However, this decision-making procedure proposed by the EU Council is too
cumbersome and complicated. It gets a lot of criticism for this reason and takes
a lot of time, because too many interests are involved in the decision- making pro-
cess. Therefore, it becomes almost impossible tomake a rapid decision. The Finan-
cial Times, modeling banking resolution process, concluded that for its succesful
outcome the EU would have to synchronize the work of nine commissions and
committees, and organize approximately 140 votes at different levels [Ìàíóêîâ,
2013; Barker, Spiegel, 2013]. There are serious doubts about the efficiency of this
system during a crisis.
Conclusions
The analysis provided by this paper shows that the supervision and integra-
tion of banks in the eurozone during a crisis situation must be implemented at the
European Union level. It is impossible to administer and govern them using only
national crisis management tools. There are several different bank regulating sys-
tems in the EU, such as the supervisorymechanism, crisis management, or resolu-
tion mechanism, which makes it difficult to perform an early intervention. The
situation can become evenmore complex due to the very strong links between the
supersiving institutions and the regulated ones. Within the Economic and Mone-
tary Union it is impossible to locally solve problems of the financial sector of one
member state. These issues transcend the national borders, harming and posing
threat to the stability of the eurozone as a whole, thus creating the need for a uni-
versal banking system.
The main pillar of the European Banking Union is the Single Resolution
Mechanism. It will complement the Single Supervisory Mechanism and be a se-
cond step on the path to creating the EBU. This system will facilitate the coopera-
tion between national institutions in case of the collapse of cross-border banking
groups. The SRM's main principle is: “Bail in”. Its essence is very simple: to ensure
that, in case of bankruptcy, banks would not pose a threat neither to the state in
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êwhich they oprerate nor to the whole economy of the eurozone. The SRM should
guarantee that in case of bank crisis, whichmight occure despite the enhanced su-
pervision, the resolution of troubled banks would be effective and performed at
the lowest cost possible, as for taxpayers, as for the real economy.
References
Agencies and Other EU Bodies, 2014, EUROPA. European Union website, http://europa.eu/
about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm [access: 15.02.2014].
Baciulis M., 2013, Support for financial institutions increases government deficits in 2012. Upward
impact of 0.4pp GDP in the EU and 0.6pp in the euro area, Eurostat. Statistics in Focus, no. 10,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-13-010/EN/KS-SF-13-010-
EN.PDF [access: 17.12.2013].
Barker A., Spiegel P., 2013, EU sets out framework for banking union, Financial Times, http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f65fa1ee-61e6-11e3-aa02-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2XaomzoSY
[access: 05.02.2014].
Blankart Ch.B., 2011,Der Staat - ein “Lender of Last Resort”?, http://lvb.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/vwl/
wtm2/ringvl/ringvlblankart [access: 25.01.2014].
CR, 2013, Council regulation (EU), No 1024/2013 of October 2013, conferring specific tasks
on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervi-
sion of credit institutions, OJ L 27/63.
EC, 2012, European Council 13/14 December 2012 conclusions, EUCO 205/12, CO EUR 19,
CONCL 5.
EC, 2012, EuropeanCouncil 28/29 June 2012 conclusions, EUCO76/12, COEUR4,CONCL2.
EC, 2013, European Commision, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution
of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Reso-
lution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation
(EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, http://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0520:FIN:LT:PDF [access: 10.12.2013].
Euro ivedimo Lietuvoje 2015 m. kiekybinio poveikio šalies ekonomikai vertinimas, 2013, „Teminiå
straipsniå serija”,Nr. 1, http://www.lb.lt/kiekybinis_euro_tyrimas [access: 21.02.2014].
Grosse T.G., 2013, Dylematy unii bankowej, Analiza natolinska, Vol. 60(2), http://www.nato-
lin.edu.pl/pdf/analizy/Natolin_Analiza_2_2013.pdf [access: 19.12.2013].
Hartmann-Wendels Th., 2013, Der Abwicklungsmechanismus, Wirtschaftsdienst. Zeitschrift
für Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 93(7).
Irische Pleitbanker haben den Staat betrogen, 2013, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 25.06.2013,
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/verraeterische-telefonmitschnitte-irische-pleit-
banker-haben-den-staat-betrogen-12244082.html [access: 19.03.2014].
JC, 2006, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2May 2006. United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European
Union. Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 – European Network and Information Security
Agency – Choice of legal basis. Case C-217/04.
JC, 2014, Case C-270/12: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014 – Uni-
ted Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament, Council
of the European Union (Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 – Short selling and certain
The Single Resolution Mechanism of the European Banking Union: its structure and functioning 87
aspects of credit default swaps – Article 28 – Validity – Legal basis – Powers of inter-
vention conferred on the European Securities and Markets Authority in exceptional
circumstances), OJ C 85/4.
Krimminger M., 2006, Controlling Moral Hazard in Bank Resolutions. Comparative Policies
& Considerations in System Design, Social Science Research Network, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1123224 [access: 29.11.2013].
Ìàíóêîâ Ñ., 2013, Åâðîïà ïûòàåòñÿ óêðåïèòü áàíêè, Ýêñïåðò Online, 16.10.2013, http://ex-
pert.ru/2013/12/25/hrupkij-ebs/ [access: 30.01.2014].
Šenavièius V., 2012, Europos S¹jungos viešosios politikos tendencijos bankå sektoriuje, Viešoji po-
litika ir administravimas, Nr. 11(1).
Van Rompuy H., 2012, Auf dem Weg zur einer echten Wirtschafts- Und Währungsunion,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/de/ec/134206.pdf
[access: 24.03.2014].
Weiss S, Hoffman I., 2012, Die Union gegen die Banken, Bertelsman Stiftung, http://www.
bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-81EF20DB-40D5E76/bst/BS_Spotlight07_DE_
web.pdf [access: 30.12.2013].
Whyte P., 2012, What a banking union means for Europe, Centre for European Reform,
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/essay_ban-
kingunion_5dec12-6704.pdf [access: 30.12.2013].
88 Algis Junevièius, Mindaugas Puidokas
